This board has been a little to quiet for while.

Is it time that Bush and Blair who is a close friend and confidant of Bush were tried for War Crimes?

Do you think the use by the American Administrations of renditions are War Crimes and committed with full knowledge of American and British leaders ie. Blair and Bush and they are ultimately responsible?

Also in the aftermath of the illegal invasion of Iraq are should their action seen to be as the provocation for the rising toll of British, American and Iraqi deaths.

As a result of the military intervention in Iraq do you think you are safer in Britain to-day?

Do you think one should expect government leaders and ministers who have been responsible for massive foreseeable casualties should visit the hospitals to meet the casualties they have produced directly or indirectly by their actions?

Kofi Annan is no doubt an honorable and clever man. However he is not qualified to pass judgement on the legality of the war. I'm not trying to be funny but if you look at his biography I believe he has a degree or something in office management.

What are Bush's qualifications for the most powerful man in the world? Specialist in stories about goats?

It doesn't matter. You can be assured both Bush and Blair took legal advice from highly qualified people before the war.

Blair is a lawyer and you can look up Bush's qualifications in a search on his biography.

The most important qualification is an electorate.

The electorate give them the mandate to govern. That's what they're paid for. If such a vast majority were against the war and subsequent foreign policy both Bush and Blair and their parties could have been voted out of office at the last elections.

People agree with Democracy, providing democratically elected leaders do what they personally want. As soon as they do not, then they suddenly become supporters of a different electoral college.
well known fact.
In actual fact. the democratically elected leaders of the world, met and voted at the UN for use of force, in a democratic process. Apparantly this can be safely ignored on the basis of one unelected, non-democratically responsible individual, and there opinion.

Morning all,

Saddam was one of the worlds biggest sponsors or terrorism. He used his cash to finance many small terror groups and provided them with not only the logistics but areas in which to train. Some of these groups later went on to join what is now called the Al Qaida. A link between the two I think.
I it common knowledge that Saddam used these groups to further his own aims and to smuggle chemical and biological componants around. The componants on thier own are harmless but when combined can form deadly chemical and biological cocktails.
The reports from the instectors and military in Iraq state that they have found no chemical weapons. Correct because they do not become a weapon until all the componants are in the same place and are mixed correctly.
You say there is no evedence that he had WMD's. ARE YOU BLIND!!! Please explain what was used to wipe out hundreds of kurds in the north of iraq. cant wait to hear your limp justifacation for that one.

I wonder why it took Goldsmith a few attempts at drawing up his bit of paper on the legallity of the IRAQ invasion.

I wonder why his conclusions were not published.

I wonder what Blair was hiding behind.

Marc, Saddam thanked America for the gas used and there was little or no condemnation of Saddam at that time.

There was ourage at the time. It was in all the papers. But no one did a thing, typical. I still remember the footage of the dead, complete villages wiped out.

Marc, I think the point bein g made is yes, there may have been outrage, but lipservice did'nt stop the killing.
The same on Former Yougoslavia. How long was it before the west ACTIVELY went in. How come they stopped arab nations from supplying arms and support to the muslims being killed, but were happy for so long to stand by and watch the genocide.
politics sucks. Life is cheap.

It seems that way, at least the troops finally went in and removed saddam.

Just thought of quite a relevant example of the goverments inability to make a decision. I am an ex soldier, during the civil war in what was Zaire, we were on stand by to resue the british nationals. for five months we sat moving between the barracks and RAF swindon waiting to go. Mean while the rebels were getting closer and closer to the capital. The goverment wouldnt make a decision because of the cost. We finaly went in just under six months from the first warning. At this stage the rebels were virtually in the capital and getting the nationals out was a far more precarious operation.
This goes to prove that the goverments inability to make a decision without six months (min) of talking is nothing new.

Marc3254

Pay attention. By 2003, just before the war, there was no evidence that Saddam still had chemical weapons. Nobody condones his use of weapons against the Kurds in the 90s (oh apart from the US who provided the gas). You should not prosecute a war retrospectively.

You are a soldier. You have to justify war because it is your job to kill people. Just don't expect the rest of us to buy into that gung- ho superficial thinking.

Firstly I was a soldier. So the fact that he had and used chemicals in the past is not proof. What proof do you want? would an inventry from a factory do for you.
He had, and used chemicals. Fact. A real threat. Fact.
Should we therefore sit back and wait for him to sell some to terror organiazations before we do anything?
If that was the course of action taken by the government you would have been sat here now winging and moaning that we should have done somthing before hand.
1oz on the underground could kill 10's of thousands of people. Is that a risk worth taking?

zscrooge

Your assertion that there was no evidence of chemcial weapons is fundamentally incorrect.

pth

ptholden

Let me make the distinction even clearer. Of course, he had chemical weapons (and he used them on the Kurds, US provided them). The point I thought I had made clear was that this occurred in the 90s and that by 2003 intelligence forces on both sides of the Atlantic suggested that this chemical threat had receded. I do not believe in retrospective war.

Marc3254 - 17 Aug 2006 13:40 - 570 of 571
He had, and used chemicals. Fact. A real threat. Fact.

Can't disagree with that - if you'll allow my bold typeface.

1oz on the underground could kill 10's of thousands of people. Is that a risk worth taking?

Yes it could. First, Saddam was in no position to use that on us. Second, has removing Saddam made the underground safer - I think not.

"chemical threat has receded".
Not quite the same as "hasn't got any, no threat at all".
I believe that it is not a risk worth taking, and I never catch the underground!! There are those that would hold to never striking the first blow, and how wonderful that would be if we could trust 6 billion people to hold the same view.
I fully support the action that was taken. It was taken for two damn good reasons (protect and free the iraqi people, and ensure the long term safety of our nation) and whether or not it has achieved those aims, it was the right thing to do, and if the circumstances arose again, I would expect any national leader to put the safety of his own country first and do the same again, if there was any doubt at all that a threat existed.
alan

If we thought more of other people and less of ourselves we may be safer!

You really think that Blair thought there was a serious threat to our country? He knew perfectly well from intelligence that this was not the case, hence the desperate need to to 'sex up' documents and the Downing Street memo.

As regards 'any doubt.' LOL! Then let's strike every nation where there is a slight doubt that there may be a threat!

Re chemical weapons. Let's have a bit of evidence rather than hazy conjecture.

No evidence of an active chemical and biological weapons program
In his State of the Union address the president cited the large volumes of chemical
and biological agents produced by Saddam Hussein and repeatedly declared: "He
has not accounted for that material. He has given no evidence that he has
destroyed it."
In fact, substantial amounts of the chemical and biological agents produced by Iraq
were accounted for and destroyed by Iraq and UN inspectors during the 1990s.21
UNSCOM reported in 1997 that "considerable quantities of chemical weapons,
their components and chemical weapons-related equipment have been
destroyed by Iraq and UNSCOM."22
During the 1990s UN inspectors destroyed 480,000 tons of live chemical agent.
They also destroyed more than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals.23 UNSCOM
found that 3,915 tons of precursors existed in 1991; it accounted directly for
2,850 tons and confirmed Iraqs claim that 823 tons were destroyed during the
Gulf War.24
In the 1990s UN inspectors supervised Iraqs destruction of 12,792 of the
13,000 155mm artillery shells filled with mustard gas Baghdad had declared as
remaining after the Gulf War ended. UNSCOM inspectors also accounted for or
destroyed 337 bombs and 6,454 rockets containing sarin.25
The UN reported in 1999 that "UNSCOM ordered and supervised the
destruction of Iraqs main declared BW [biological weapons] production and
development facility, Al Hakam. Some 60 pieces of equipment from three other
facilities involved in proscribed BW activities as well as some 22 tonnes of
growth media for BW production collected from four other facilities were also
destroyed. As a result, the declared facilities of Iraqs BW programme have
been destroyed and rendered harmless."26
UN inspectors destroyed all of Iraqs known chemical and biological weapons
production facilities. In the months prior to the war UN monitors conducted
hundreds of inspections of possible chemical, biological, and missile sites in
Iraq and found no evidence or documentation confirming the existence of the
alleged chemical and biological stockpiles.
Sites that the U.S. and Britain alleged were involved in the production of
biological or chemical weapons were repeatedly inspected by UNMOVIC.
These included Falluja II, at which inspectors found a chlorine plant not even in
operation, and al-Dawra Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which
appeared to journalists as having not been reconstructed since its destruction
in the mid-1990s. The inspectors reported no evidence of the production of
proscribed agents at these sites.27
According to an investigative report in U.S. News and World Report, the
Defense Intelligence Agency issued a classified assessment in September
2002 stating "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons."28

No evidence of mobile biological weapons labs
Secretary of State Powell claimed that Iraq developed mobile biological weapons
laboratories. Powell said that the United States had "firsthand descriptions of
biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails." He cited Iraqi defectors
associated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as sources for these charges.
He offered no physical or documentary evidence, however, providing only an
animation to depict such facilities.29
After the war U.S. investigators discovered two trailers that it claimed were
mobile weapons labs, but no biological or chemical agents were actually
detected in the vehicles and independent experts cast doubt on the claim.30
UN inspectors searched extensively for mobile laboratories during the 1990s but
found no evidence confirming their existence.
Hans Blix told reporters on 4 February that UN monitors inspected two alleged
mobile labs and found nothing. "Two food-testing trucks have been inspected
and nothing has been found."31
Dr. Blix told the New York Times on 5 February: "We have had reports for a
long time about these mobile units. . . . We have never found one. We have
not seen any signs of things being moved around, whether tracks in the sand
or in the ground."32
In his 7 March report to the Security Council Dr. Blix stated that, "several
inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to
mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile
workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed-processing
equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found."33
"We know from UNSCOM that Iraq was pursuing mobile fermentation," said a
senior U.S. Defense Department official on 13 September 2002, "but the
inspections never found them."34
Former UNSCOM chairman Eks expressed skepticism about mobile labs at a
3 February 2003 press briefing:
UNSCOM never found any mobile labs. . . . There is . . . the question
of how to transport a bio lab by road. On their roads it will shake
around in transportation. It is a tremendous high-risk operation if a
truck runs into another truck . . . for a bio lab you need electricity, a
ventilation system, such as HEPA filters, a system that is highly
sophisticated and complex.35
Former UN weapons inspector and microbiologist Raymond Zilinskas told the
Washington Post that Powell's descriptions of the alleged mobile labs did not ring
true. A fermentation cycle would normally take thirty-six to forty-eight hours, not
the twenty-four hours suggested by Powell. He also noted that such facilities
would generate large quantities of highly toxic waste. "This strikes me as a bit
far-fetched," he observed.36
A former senior UNSCOM inspector told a reporter for the Los Angeles Times
in September 2002 that his inspection teams searched for such mobile labs
from 1993 to 1998 without success. "I launched raid after raid," he said. "We
intercepted their radio traffic. We ran roadblocks. We never found anything. It
was just speculation."37

References
21 United Nations, Report of the Executive Chairman on the Activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of resolution 687 (1991),
S/1998/332, New York, 16 April 1998.
22 United Nations, Letter dated 22 November 1997 from the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/922,
New York, 24 November 1997, para. 12.
23 United Nations, Report of the Executive Chairman on the Activities of the Special Commission,
S/1998/332, and British Foreign Office, "Foreign Office Paper on Iraqi Threat and Work of
UNSCOM," London, 4 February 1998.
24 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent
Representatives of The Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, S/1999/94, New York, 29 January 1999.
25 United Nations, Letter dated 27 January 1999, S/1999/94.
26 United Nations, Letters dated 27 and 30 March 1999, S/1999/356.
Unproven: The Controversy over Justifying War in Iraq 15
27 Originally printed in Glen Rangwala, Nathaniel Hurd, and Alistair Millar, "A Case for Concern,
Not a Case for War," Middle East Report Online, 28 January 2003. Available online at MERIP
(4 June 2003).
28 Bruce B. Auster, Mark Mazzetti, and Edward T. Pound, Truth and Consequences, U.S. News
and World Report, 9 June 2003, 17.
29 Animated slides can be found at the U. S. Department of State, "Biological Weapons," Slides
20-22, 5 February 2003. Available online at the Department of State
(6 February 2003).
30 William J. Broad, "After the War: Biological Warfare; U.S., in Assessment, Terms Trailers Germ
Laboratories," New York Times, 29 May 2003, A5.
31 Dan Plesch, "U.S. Claim Dismissed by Blix," The Guardian, 5 February 2003.
32 Julia Preston with Steven R. Weisman, "Powell to charge Iraq is shifting its illegal arms to foil
inspectors," New York Times, 5 February 2003, A1.
33 Dr. Hans Blix, United Nations, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission, Security Council 7 March 2003 Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of
UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix, 7 March 2003. Available online at the United
Nations (4 June 2003).
34 U.S. Government, Department of Defense, "Background briefing on terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction," 13 September 2002. Available online at DefenseLINK
(3 February 2003).
35 Rolf Eks, "Briefing on Iraq."
36 Joby Warrick, "Despite Defectors' Accounts, Evidence Remains Anecdotal," Washington Post,
6 February 2003, A28.
37 Bob Drogin and Maggie Farley, "Inspectors Face Iraq's 'Dark Years'," Los Angeles Times, 9
Sept 2002.