Dil
- 19 Aug 2010 20:24
- 8503 of 8631
We may have all been better off if he hadn't spent so much time arsing around on bulletein boards , called the cops in on day one and then tried to make something of the "IP" we are supposed to have but hey wtfdik.
No one involved in this scam will end up getting done for it imo but I do genuinley hope I'm wrong.
Dil
- 20 Aug 2010 01:15
- 8504 of 8631
Copied from advfn , mdx v trevillion and another ... judges verdict?/summary?/whatever , any thoughts tabby ?????????
Well worth a read , some of it defies belief .... 7, 13 , and 15 !!!
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
Case No.HC09C02262
Friday, 6th August 2010
Before: MR. JUSTICE FLOYD
1 These proceedings are a good illustration of why very careful consideration needs to be given by any party who seeks a freezing order to all the consequences of so doing. Meldex International Plc (Meldex) applied for a worldwide freezing order against Richard Trevillion, the first defendant, and Stephen Martin, the second defendant. It was applied without notice to either defendant on the basis of serious allegations of fraudulent conduct in connection with the affairs of Meldex.
2 Those allegations amounted in substance to a suggestion that the defendants were entering into wholly uncommercial, sometimes described as fictitious transactions in order to inflate the value of Meldexs shares beyond their true value and so as to increase the bonuses which would be paid to them by Meldex. Whilst the word fraud was not expressly used in the particulars of claim, there is no doubt that the allegations made by Meldex against both defendants amounted in substance to allegations of dishonest behaviour.
3 The freezing order was granted by Peter Smith J in July 2009. He did so on the basis of an affidavit of Mr. Muncaster, amongst other materials, Mr. Muncaster being a director of Meldex. The affidavit claimed that the cross-undertaking in damages was well fortified because the company had net assets in excess of 4 million.
4 In due course the order of Peter Smith J was served on the first defendant and he applied for the order to be discharged on the grounds of material non-disclosure and misrepresentation. The material which was put together by the first defendant was highly cogent and explained the fact that, amongst other things, he was not directly concerned in many of the transactions in question; and those in which he was concerned appeared to have a proper commercial foundation.
5 The application also drew attention to the fact that the net asset position of the company was not as stated. In fact, the net asset position of Meldex showed a deficit of 2.4 million, a situation which, on its own, would have been a sufficient material non-disclosure to justify the discharge of the order.
6 Outside court on the date fixed for the hearing of the first defendants application to set aside the freezing order, Meldex agreed that the freezing order should indeed be discharged. They also agreed to pay the first defendants costs of the freezing order and the application and made an immediate payment of 20,000 towards those costs, the remaining costs being the first defendants costs in the case.
7 In addition, and as part of that agreement, Meldex agreed to provide security for costs which, given the net asset position as it was by that time known, was obviously required. Meldex said they were unable to provide more than a limited amount of security themselves, and accordingly offered security by means of their two directors giving a charge over their respective family homes. The two directors, Mr. Muncaster and Mr. Cressman, were either contacted in connection with the giving of that undertaking or were present. However, it subsequently transpired that neither director was in a position to grant such security. Mr. Muncaster did not even own the relevant property which was owned by third parties, a Mr. and Mrs. Bailey, who, understandably, were not content for security to be granted over their house.
8 Given that the consent order required the giving of security and that the first defendant was left entirely without any form of security, he applied in due course in April 2010 to strike out the claimants claim against him. At the last minute, the claimant notified the first defendant and his representatives that it would not be attending court. In consequence and having heard the argument presented on that day by counsel for the first defendant, the claimants claim against the first defendant was struck out. Sales J summarised the position with which he was faced as follows:
A claim was brought by the claimant against the defendants which includes a claim in what is in substance in fraud against the first and second defendants which, in my view, is not pleaded with proper particularity so far as the first defendant is concerned. On the basis of that claim, a worldwide freezing injunction was obtained by the claimant against the first defendant but in circumstances where there was material non-disclosure by the claimant and where, once that issue was to be tested before the court, the claimant conceded that the freezing injunction should be discharged. The relevant order in issue before me was made by consent and required provision of substantial security by and on behalf of the claimant. There has been a complete failure by the claimant and Mr. Muncaster and Mr. Cressman to comply with para.3(ii) of the order and the requirement of provision of the further security in the sum of 400,000 as set out there.
No adequate alternative proposals have been put forward as to how that additional security would be provided, and in my view no adequate explanation has been given as to how the claimant, on the instructions of Mr. Muncaster and Mr. Cressman, could have agreed to the terms of para.3(ii) of the order of 3rd March and then turned round within a short period thereafter to make it clear that that provision either could not be or would not be complied with.
Finally, one has the bald letter from Mills & Reeve of 21st May, sent after the first defendant had filed evidence and had had to prepare to meet the claimants case on this application based on evidence filed on behalf of the claimant, indicating that the claimant does not oppose the application but giving no good explanation for the claimants sudden change in position in that regard.
9 In the light of that Sales J struck out the claim. He was not prepared, because no adequate notice had been given, to make a decision in relation to indemnity costs or in relation to the amount of any interim payment. It is those issues which, by virtue of two adjournments, come before me today.
10 The court has a wide discretion in relation to the basis on which the assessment of costs is to be carried out. For present purposes it is sufficient, because the principle is not in issue, to quote the relevant commentary in the White Book:
The making of a costs order on the indemnity basis would be appropriate in circumstances where the facts of the case and/or the conduct of the parties was such as to take the situation away from the norm (see Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd. v. Salisbury Hammer Aspden & Johnson and Betesh & Company [2002] EWCA (Civ. 879)).
Following Excelsior it is appropriate to award costs on the indemnity basis where the conduct of a party has taken a situation away from the norm. It is not always necessary to show deliberate misconduct, in some cases unreasonable conduct to a high degree would suffice.
11 In advancing the claim for indemnity costs this morning, Mr. Hubbard, who appears on behalf of the first defendant, relies on essentially four areas. Firstly, he relies on the unparticularised allegations of fraud; secondly, he says the claims were brought for an improper purpose; thirdly, he relies on the fact that the freezing injunction was obtained following material non-disclosures; and fourthly, he relies on conduct in relation to the litigation and the consent order.
12 Before me this morning Meldex has appeared by Mr. Muncaster, its director, and I gave him permission to make such submissions as he wished on behalf of Meldex. At an extraordinarily late stage he produced a skeleton argument of some three pages, and a lengthy witness statement. Both these documents seek to reopen matters of substance in relation to the case which has been struck out. It is obviously wholly inappropriate for me to consider those matters.
13 Mr. Muncaster in his address to me said that three judges had agreed that there was a case to be answered here and that Meldexs conduct was, therefore, not to be criticised. That suggestion seems to me to be wholly misconceived once one appreciates that the freezing order was obtained on the basis of evidence which contained material misrepresentations and exaggerations, and was subsequently agreed to be discharged by the company itself.
14 Secondly, Mr. Muncaster told me that Meldex consented to the release of the freezing order because the first defendant said that he only had 4,000 by way of assets, having transferred his house and other assets to his wife some time previously. Whether or not that is the true reason for the abandonment of the freezing order is rather difficult to bottom out on the basis of that mere assertion. Mr. Hubbard points out that if that was the reason it took the claimants from 9th December 2009 (the date on which the first defendant revealed his asset position) to 3rd March 2010 to take any action to release the first defendant from the freezing injunction. It seems to me that even if I were to accept Mr. Muncasters explanation as wholly true, he then has to deal, and has not dealt, with the fact that the first defendant continued to be bound by the terms of a stringent order in relation to his assets for a period approaching three months without the benefit of knowing that Meldex were going to abandon it at the last possible opportunity.
15 Thirdly, Mr. Muncaster sought to explain the misrepresentation as to the asset position of Meldex by reference to the fact that what had been intended to be referred to was the group position. This again is going over old ground because it was conceded in the skeleton argument on behalf of Meldex, which was in due course not argued in court, that there had been a material misrepresentation in relation to the asset position. Mr. Muncaster did not help the position of Meldex this morning by saying that the net asset position of Meldex was, in fact, 2 million, rather than 4 million, forgetting to put a minus sign in front of the 2 million.
16 As I have mentioned, one of the factors relied on by the first defendant is that these proceedings were motivated by improper motives and in particular by a vendetta against the first defendant. Perhaps the most striking matter that they relied on concerned a paragraph in Mr. Muncasters witness statement which, on one reading, might be said to suggest that he would not have started the proceedings on behalf of Meldex if it had been known that the defendants had the ability to defend them with access to insurance cover. That particular passage, it seems to me, in the light of matters which have come to light subsequently, may not have quite the meaning which the claimant seeks to place upon it. Nevertheless, and putting that to one side, it does appear to me that the evidence does suggest that a certain amount of ill-feeling was behind these proceedings.
17 Even putting all that to one side, it seems to me that, as a matter almost of policy, it should be made clear by this court that where proceedings of this nature are started they have a devastating effect on those against whom they are pursued. These proceedings were not only wrongly commenced against the first defendant so far as one is able to tell, but were abandoned as soon as a serious challenge was put.
18 It seems to me that this is a classic case in which the costs order should reflect the courts disapproval of the conduct of the claimant in pursuing it in the way they have done and in using the courts process in the way which I have described. For those reasons it seems to me to be entirely fair and just that an order for costs on the indemnity basis should be made.
19 I turn, therefore, to the question of an interim payment. The mathematics appear in this way: the first defendants costs to date are of the order of 600,000. If I were to order an interim payment of 300,000 then after deduction of the sum that has already been paid the interim payment should be 200,000.
20 There are two schools of thought about where to pitch the interim payment. In Mars UK Limited v. Teknowledge it was suggested that one should be so cautious as to ensure that the sum which one ordered was one which the receiving party was bound to recover in any event. On the other hand, excessive caution could be said to provoke the need for a detailed assessment because the amount in dispute is likely to be so large that an assessment may be worthwhile. Following that alternative school of thought, one would try and pitch the interim payment as close as possible to the sum which ultimately will be recovered.
21 Mr. Hubbard submits that in the present case 65 per cent would be the appropriate sum, yielding a figure closer to 288,000. Whilst in the present case I think it may be dangerous to go that far, it seems to me that the right sum to order by way of interim payment is 250,000, and I propose to make an order in that sum.
L A T E R :
22 This is an application for security for costs by the second defendant in the litigation which I have described in the judgment I gave earlier this morning. The principle of the claimants being liable to give security for the costs of the second defendant is not in dispute and it has been accepted by solicitors on behalf of Meldex that security will be given. There is an issue about the amount of security. I should also, in the exercise of my discretion, have regard to the sum which is ordered so as not to make the sum one which it is impossible for the claimants to pay.
23 As to that, the second defendant has estimated that some 800,000 might be spent on his behalf between the commencement of these proceedings and the conclusion of the trial. It seems to me that that may be an over-estimate, and in any event it may never actually happen, but it does seem to me to be reasonable to provide security up to and including exchange of witness statements in this case.
24 The sum which is asked on that basis is 150,000, which seems to me, particularly in the light of the fact that already 81,000 has been spent on behalf of the second defendant, to be a reasonable sum by way of security, taking into account the consideration that I have already mentioned that is to say the sum should not be one which is obviously impossible for the claimant to pay.
25 As to that, I have got very little material to go by so far as the claimant is concerned as to what efforts it has made to raise money to provide that sort of security. Mr. Muncaster, the director of Meldex, has told me that the shareholders are, in principle, very supportive of the case and if that is so there is no reason why they should not provide that sort of sum by way of security.
26 Mr. Muncasters real point this morning is that I should adjourn or stay the application for security, or the proceedings as a whole, pending some application which apparently is pending before the Master to obtain third party disclosure against a company called Crescent which it is hoped will somehow fortify the claim which the claimant is bringing against the second defendant. It seems to me that that would not be an appropriate course to take. It is something which is raised at the very last moment and which the second defendant has had no opportunity of dealing with. It seems to me, to say the least, surprising that at this very advanced stage of the litigation the claimant should be seeking documents to establish whether the allegations which they made as long ago as July 2009 had any substance in them. It seems to me that there simply is not enough material for me to say that it would be right to wait until the outcome of that application before the order for security is made. Nor is there, in my judgment, sufficient linkage between that application and this for there to be a need for a stay.
27 If the litigation against the second defendant is to be pursued there must be some prospect that if he succeeds he is able to get his costs back for defending himself. At the moment there is no such prospect. Security is obviously necessary, as recognised by Meldex, and the sum claimed is, in my judgment, entirely reasonable.
28 For those reasons, I propose to make an order that by four oclock on 20th August the claimant gives security for the second defendants costs of the claim up to the exchange of witness statements in the sum of 150,000 in the form set out in the draft order which has been placed before me.
29 Pending the provision of security the proceedings are stayed, and unless security is given the claim will be struck out as per para.3 of that order.
30 The costs of the second defendants application will be costs in the case.
tabasco
- 22 Aug 2010 12:45
- 8509 of 8631
Somebody with a hunch mentioned Festering Pustule was Gausie and his gangaint got a Scooby doo myself? He dont seem to threaten Barry in his old reckless abandon way
Perhaps his egotistical charm has taken a joltwhat with Barry and Michael putting him straight!must gosee you Monday.toddle pip
Gausie
- 22 Aug 2010 18:22
- 8510 of 8631
Lol - Batty - the ball's firmly in Bazza's court. He has no valid complaint about the questions I posed and has now F*cked off again whimpering "one day I'll be back" or some such platitude. Another one of Bazza's prophecies that time will be the judge of. If bazza even turns up in court.
And I've never threatened Bazza - the only threats have been the empty and hollow threats that he's made towards me.
jkd
- 22 Aug 2010 20:22
- 8511 of 8631
seems G has answered regarding t's post about Barry.Like t i also dont have a clue about any of that stuff.
anyway t seems to be talking to and about himself yet again.
"perhaps his egostistical charm has taken a jolt... what with Barry and Michael putting him straight!"
G has already replied to the Barry part so that just leaves the Michael part.
so Michael has put t straight. thats my reading of it.seems to have worked. could be wrong. please dyor.
regards
jkd
ps anyway, invest another 2500 and trust me, or , lose the lot, what sort of ultimatum was that? luckily that extra investment was guaranteed secured and returnable, wasnt it? please dont anyone tell me it wasnt. surely not? i really dont know. can anyone enlighten me? thank you.
Regards
jkd