Thought I'd start a new thread as this is going to be a major talking point this year...have not made up my mind yet...(unlike bucksfizz)....but thinking of voting for an exit as Europe is not doing Britain any good at all it seems....

Damn!

I went into the back bedroom to reach up and get two or three toilet rolls off the top of our pile and the whole thing collapsed, spilling tins of sardines, bottles of olive oil, tins of tomatoes, etc, etc, etc, etc, all onto the landing.

They were absolutely buried. In fact, it was quicker to go back to Aldi and buy some more rather than plough our way through our stockpile to find them.

Grrrr!

Anybody else now got stockpile(s) going?

10601 - jezzer is a dog

=============

stockpile?
what a silly kneejerk thing to do

Peppermint tea bags, Heinz baked beans, and Kleenex Velvet toilet roll, to name but a few. I also buy Encona Carolina Reaper Chilli sauce for my German neighbour who loves it. Just can't get those things here....

guess you really can't wipe your arse on swiss chocolate, watches and € 500 notes, especially if smeared with hot chilli sauce

The Bin Ladens were removed from circulation a year or two back, Cyners. I'll never forget a guy in front of me in the BricoDepot queue pulling a fat wedge of them out of his wallet once - the one and only time I've seen them.

Edit: Apparently they'll be removed soon.

surely they were several years ago
glad i got rid of all mine :-)

Pate de foie gras, Champaigne, confit de canard, French Fish Soup, will be well stocked. What a celebration that will be.

Hmmm? Must start shopping at Lidl!

Dead Ringers :) radio 4 hysterical.

No Deal Is No Nightmare: Facts About EU Trade After Brexit
Written by 'Briefings For Brexit'

Taken from: https://briefingsforbrexit.com/no-deal-is-no-nightmare-facts-about-eu-trade-after-brexit/

Contents:

1. Executive summary
2. Virtually frictionless trade under WTO rules
3. Intra-EU trade not without frictions
4. Imports from the EU under WTO rules
5. UK exports to the EU under WTO rules
6. No ‘hard border’ in Northern Ireland
7. No long queues at Dover
8. EU tariffs and potential regulatory checks not significant
9. Transportation and travel will not be disrupted
10. Annex: Solutions being implemented by HMRC to minimise trade frictions as part of no-deal Brexit customs planning

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Leaving the EU under WTO rules is repeatedly described, whether through ignorance or deceit, as ‘crashing out’ or ‘going over a cliff’. This report shows that the reality of a WTO exit is nothing like this.

1.2 There is a myth that our present trade with the EU is ‘frictionless’, while trade on WTO terms is beset with ‘frictions’. We show why this is a false dichotomy, and why in practice intra-EU trading arrangements are not very different from those on WTO terms.

1.2 We already have virtually frictionless trade with the rest of the world through electronic customs declarations, goods pre-clearance and trusted trader schemes, all operated under the EU’s Union Customs Code. This would in future apply to our trade with the EU.

Imports from the EU under no-deal

1.3 The only additional physical checks on EU imports after Brexit would be customs duty checks, but they are unlikely to exceed the current threshold – less than 3% of imports are checked on entry (see para 4.1). If necessary, the UK could unilaterally suspend duties for a short period to avoid any immediate difficulties. In addition, HMRC is implementing a range of technical solutions (see Annex 10) to minimise trade frictions.

British exports to the EU under WTO rules

1.4 Most exporters are already used to Union Customs Code (UCC) export processes, and HMRC has issued guidelines for ‘no-deal’ trading with the EU. The EU has established customs systems (already used on the Swiss border, for example), and new technology is available to trace and identify cargoes (paras 2.4-2.6).

No ‘hard border’ in Northern Ireland

VAT and excise duties are already collected in the UK and the Irish Republic without any border control. A study commissioned by the European Parliament found that ‘international standards and best practices and technologies’ can be used to avoid a ‘hard border’, and this has been confirmed by both Irish and British authorities. Where necessary, inland inspection facilities can be established. Technology exists for tracking cargoes (paras 2.5-2.6).

Will there be queues at Dover?

This is theoretically possible but in practice highly unlikely. WTO rules prohibit checks undertaken for political reasons or for competitive advantage. French officials have dismissed fears of a Calais ‘go-slow’ and suggested that as few as 1% of UK lorries would be subject to a physical check. New technology is already being installed at Calais to avoid delays, with automated checks (paras 7.7, 7.8).

HMRC is preparing for all scenarios post-Brexit, and has set up inland inspection facilities to divert traffic away from Channel ports for targeted checks if necessary. The UK accedes to international transit conventions in its own right, and these enable simplified customs transit procedures right across the world and cover all countries in the EU (paras 7.9-7.11).

Can we take the risk that next April UK firms will be faced with EU tariffs and potential regulatory checks?

Tariffs and regulatory checks could be disruptive for a minority of UK businesses, namely, those connected with dairy products and meat. This works both ways. British producers are likely to increase their share of the domestic market by reducing EU imports subsidised at higher rates than they receive. Moreover, the impact can be mitigated by government action (paras 8.2-8.5)

Most engineering firms will be little affected. Car companies can withstand 10% tariffs on sales into the EU and 4.5% tariffs on components from the EU since they have benefited from a 15% depreciation in sterling. Border checks on their components from the EU will be illegal under WTO rules which prohibit unnecessary checks.

Travel and transportation

The EU has already made a reciprocal offer to the UK in respect of air traffic rights and the validity of aviation safety certificates in the event of no-deal.

Reciprocal visa-free travel has already been agreed. The EU has announced that the mutual recognition of driving licences and road vehicles will continue. So taking one’s car abroad or hiring a vehicle on holiday should be no more complicated than it is now (section 9).

MAIN REPORT

2. Virtually frictionless trade under WTO rules

10.1.We already have virtually frictionless trade with the rest of the world through electronic customs declarations, goods pre-clearance and trusted trader schemes, all operated under the EU’s Union Customs Code.
10.2.There is no reason to turn back the clock to paper checks when goods arrive at the border, as implied by the ‘cliff edge’ doomsday prophets.
10.3.We start from a strong position. The UK in 2016 was ranked 5th in the world by the World Customs Organisation for the ease of its import and export processes.
10.4.Customs can operate with no technology at all using well tried customs techniques including the EU’s own TRANSIT and TRACE systems. The heads of UK and Irish customs concur with this judgment.
2.5 Example: most goods crossing the Swiss borders use established customs systems (TRANSIT and TRACE systems) to drive through customs without stopping and without any monitoring at the border.

2.6 New technology in the form of tamper-proof chips can be used to connect the physical cargo with the import declaration. This would highlight incorrectly declared goods, and allow for differential taxation based on the location/declaration combination.

3. Intra-EU trade not without frictions

10.1.EU goods are not exempt from certain controls on import, so there is no truly ‘frictionless’ trade in place even now.
10.2.Targeted checks where criminality is suspected are required even on intra-EU trade. This is to satisfy member states’ obligations to the EU to tackle fraud.
10.3.In the Withdrawal Agreement backstop (NI Protocol, Annex 3), the EU has mandated the creation of a paper document (the A.UK movement certificate) to accompany all goods traded between GB, NI and the EU. This will in fact add trade friction to an arrangement supposedly designed to avoid the need for border controls.

4. Imports from the EU under WTO rules

10.1.Less than 3% of total imports are checked on entry into the UK. This percentage is unlikely to change in a no-deal Brexit.
10.2.Even in 2008, 99% of goods entering the UK were cleared electronically.
10.3.Imports from the EU are already subject to checks (see section 3).
10.4.The only additional physical checks on EU imports after Brexit would be customs duty checks. But these are unlikely to exceed the current threshold required to ensure compliance with our current EU obligations.
10.5.Given the same level of EU imports after 29 March 2019 as currently, the level of physical checks that will be required on EU imports is unlikely to increase.

5. UK Exports to the EU under WTO rules

10.1.HMRC has issued no-deal guidance for exporters.
10.2.Exporters to the rest of the world (i.e. the majority of UK exporters) will already be used to the system under the EU’s Union Customs Code (UCC) rules, which will be adapted to UK law.
10.3.Traders who currently export ONLY to the EU27 will not be familiar with UCC export processes, so this procedure will be new to them, but this is a very small number of exporters (only 8% of all UK businesses trade with the EU, and of those, many also export to the rest of the world under UCC rules).
10.4.However, the EU’s Union Customs Code (UCC) was introduced across the EU on 1 May 2016. Anyone who intends to export to the EU after a no-deal Brexit can find out now about how it works from the European Commission website.
10.5.All UCC requirements on UK exporters to the EU will be familiar to the customs authorities in the EU27, since there will be no change other than implementing the existing UCC import procedures for goods from the UK.

6. No ‘hard border’ in Northern Ireland

10.1.VAT and excise dues are already collected by the authorities in both countries without anyone ever being stopped at the border.
10.2.Smuggling and excise fraud already takes place across the NI border, e.g. fuel in tankers disguised as milk lorries, excise goods shipped through bonded warehouses. This is combatted by police and fraud investigators in targeted operations almost always away from the border itself.
10.3.WTO rules do not require border checks on goods – that is a matter for each country to decide. The only requirement is to treat all third countries equally (the ‘most favoured nation’ rule – MFN).
10.4.Physical checks can be conducted away from the border, as they already are for fraud and other non-duty checks in NI. Inland inspection facilities are now established in mainland UK and could also be set up in NI.
10.5.A study commissioned by the European Parliament found that ‘international standards and best practices and technologies’ can be used to avoid a ‘hard border’ in NI.
10.6.Hans Maessen, a Dutch customs specialist: technical solutions can ensure no hardening of the Irish border in ways that damage the Belfast Agreement and peace process.
10.7.The customs technology to minimise or avoid border checks is available and is being used in many other applications (see 7.7, 7.8, Annex 10).
10.8.At both the Norway-Sweden border and the Canada-US border, low friction borders have been created by sharing data and facilities, and the creation of electronic environments for trade and travel.
10.9.Both the Irish Republic and HMRC already operate electronic customs clearance systems under the UCC (para 5.4), a key aspect of invisible borders. HMRC is domesticating UCC provisions into UK law, so procedures will remain the same for customs, VAT and excise.
10.10.Ireland has already published guidance with links to electronic systems for no-deal trade with the UK post-Brexit.
10.11.The head of UK customs, Jon Thompson, has repeatedly confirmed in select committee hearings that there is absolutely no need for the UK to erect a hard border under any scenario, including leaving without a deal.
10.12.Irish Taoisech Leo Varadkar has also repeatedly confirmed that the Republic of Ireland will not erect a hard border in the event of no-deal.
10.13.The heads of a number of prominent UK and Irish businesses have asserted that invisible borders are now possible. This can all be achieved with existing technical solutions, and in compliance with the EU’s Union Customs Code.

7. No long queues at Dover

10.1.While queues at Dover are theoretically possible, it would require French customs to instigate unnecessary and excessive checks at Calais and elsewhere. But this is highly unlikely, for several reasons.
10.2.WTO rules prohibit unnecessary checks undertaken for political reasons or for competitive advantage. The UK can maintain de facto alignment with EU for as long as it considers necessary, in order to avoid the need for checks.
10.3.Even those who maintain that some additional checks would be required accept that these could be limited. There is no legal requirement to inspect more than a tiny fraction of vehicles.
10.4.French officials have dismissed fears of a Calais ‘go-slow’ and suggested that as few as 1% of UK lorries would be subject to a physical check.
10.5.Julian Jessop of the IEA has produced a rough calculation: for there to be an additional two-minute delay on average in crossing the frontier, it would require at least 10% of UK lorries to be subject to a new 20-minute check — i.e. ten times more than French officials have indicated will be checked.
10.6.EU preparations for no-deal only say that checks may be conducted, not that they will be.
10.7.New technology is already being installed at Calais to avoid delays, with automated checks and a turf war about where lorries might be inspected.
10.8.A rail freight scanner has already been installed at Fréthun near Calais for unaccompanied rail freight (boosting Eurotunnel’s freight revenues considerably). This allows French customs to scan containers on 30 trains per day without the need for them to stop before they enter or leave the Channel Tunnel.
10.9.Under the UK’s Transit Regulations (November 2018), the UK accedes to international transit conventions in its own right. These enable simplified customs transit procedures right across the world and cover all countries in the EU.
10.10.Physical checks that are needed can be conducted away from the border, as they already are in many countries.
10.11.HMRC is preparing for all scenarios post-Brexit, and has set up inland inspection facilities to divert traffic away from Channel ports for targeted checks. (see 10.7)
10.12.Currently, ‘intelligence led’ inspections by the UK affect only 2% of non-EU goods shipments. The remainder are cleared immediately by computer-based procedures.

8. Impact of EU customs and regulatory checks not significant

8.1 WTO rules prohibit unnecessary checks, and it is highly unlikely that more than 1% of goods would be checked (see section 6).

8.2 Additional customs and regulatory checks could admittedly be disruptive for a minority of UK businesses. Namely, those connected with dairy products, meat and fresh foods, which cannot tolerate long delays.

8.3 But this works both ways. Unwarranted regulatory checks at Calais could lead to French importers suffering tit-for-tat delays at Dover.

8.4 To avoid this, the French have already installed scanning technology to speed up clearance at Calais (7.7, 7.8).

8.5 The AEO trusted trader scheme under the UCC should eliminate the need for physical customs checks at Calais, since goods can be pre-cleared for customs electronically.

8.6 Most engineering firms will be little affected (hence why heads of firms like Dyson, JCB and Northern Ireland’s Wrightbus support Brexit).

8.7 Car companies can withstand 10% tariffs on sales into the EU and 4.5% tariffs on components from the EU since they have benefited from a 15% depreciation in sterling.

9. Transportation and travel will not be disrupted

10.1.The EU has already made a reciprocal offer to the UK in respect of air traffic rights and the validity of aviation safety certificates in the event of ‘no deal’.
10.2.Several French regional airports derive close to 80% of their traffic from UK-owned airlines. Local tourism would be ruined by prohibitions on landing rights.
10.3.France has passed legislation giving the President decree-making powers to ensure minimal disruption.
10.4.Reciprocal visa-free travel for trips of up to 90 days has already been agreed between the UK and EU – even in the event of no-deal.
10.5.In its no-deal preparedness notices on travel, the EU has announced that the mutual recognition of driving licences and road vehicles will continue under the rules of the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic 1968.
10.6.In March 2018 the British government announced that it would be ratifying the Convention in its own right. This means taking one’s car abroad or hiring a vehicle on holiday should be no more complicated than it is now.

10. Annex: Solutions being implemented by HMRC to minimise trade frictions as part of no-deal Brexit customs planning

10.1 Replicating the rules and procedures in the EU’s Union Customs Code to operate domestically under the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018, thus ensuring no unexpected changes for UK importers or for EU exporters to the UK. The first regulations under the Act, including the Import and Transit regulations, were made on 30 November 2018.

10.2 A new online Customs Declarations System to replace the 25 year-old CHIEF system. Expected to be able to handle up to 400 million declarations a year.

10.3 Importers will be able to declare import VAT on their VAT monthly return, rather than at the border – thus mitigating cashflow and procedural problems.

10.4 Trusted trader schemes are provided for in the new Import regulations (Part 9). This further minimises paperwork and the need for border controls.

10.5 Big manufacturers or food importers reliant on just-in-time deliveries from the EU27 should be registered as Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs). This means that freight is pre-cleared electronically (as is currently the case for most rest of the world imports) and not held up for checks at the border.

10.6 Major supermarkets who import produce from outside the EU will already be familiar with the AEO system. The no-deal UK system will replicate exactly what they are used to under the UCC, and so should enable them to handle produce imported from the EU27 in the same way as they do for produce imported from Africa or South America.

10.7 Inland inspection facilities to check the small number of consignments that will need to be physically checked have already been set up. Staff are currently being recruited. There is a large facility at Magna Park, Milton Keynes and another at Hayes. This means lorries can be directed away from ports for targeted checks, minimising delays.

10.8 The Import Regulations mandate electronic pre-clearance for customs as RoRo ports, to avoid delays at Dover.

10.9 There could be contingency plans to waive checks if required to avoid gridlock for security reasons. (The growth in unaccompanied rail freight scanned automatically would also reduce the number of lorries over time.)

10.10 HMRC has already published no-deal notices and guidance for importers and exporters on its website: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/exporting-and-importing-goods-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-with-no-deal

All of these plans are well advanced. If just-in-time importers get themselves set up and registered as AEOs, their EU imports should not be subject to any delays on entering the UK.

Factcheck: What will really happen if MPs vote down May’s deal?

From: https://briefingsforbrexit.com/factcheck-what-will-really-happen-if-mps-vote-down-mays-deal/

Written by Anna Bailey, Richard Aikens
3/12/2018

Over the past few days, we have been made aware of some extremely dubious arguments being made to try and convince wavering Conservative MPs to vote in favour of the draft Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU (hereafter: ‘the deal’).

The decision to vote for or against the deal is the most important constitutional decision that parliament will make since it passed the European Communities Act in 1972. We therefore considered it imperative to subject these claims to rigorous legal fact-check and academic analysis.

We urge all MPs to fully acquaint themselves with the legal facts on both EU withdrawal and UK parliamentary elections before voting.

“If you vote down the deal we will stay in the EU because there is no majority for no-deal.” Argument made to Leave-supporting MPs

Not true.

Or more accurately, the ‘we will stay in the EU’ part is untrue. It is true that there is not a majority of MPs in the House of Commons who favour a no-deal outcome. But the crucial point is that a no-deal outcome does not require the passing of legislation. It is the default legal position under Article 50. In the absence of a deal passed by both UK and EU parliaments, a no-deal exit on 29 March 2019 occurs automatically.

“If you vote down the deal we will end up with no-deal.” Argument made too Remain-voting MPs

Possible. (NB: directly contradictory things are being said to different MPs!)

As detailed above, a no-deal outcome is the default legal position unless a Withdrawal Agreement is approved by both the UK Parliament and the EU Parliament. Theoretically, the UK and EU could hold emergency renegotiations to try and meet the rebels’ concerns, but realistically time is tight, and the EU may well be unwilling to renegotiate. An off-the-peg option of temporary UK membership of the EEA during the transition period is possible as a simple emergency compromise. However, it is not clear if there would be a parliamentary majority for this either.

Finally, much depends on what one means by ‘no-deal’. A so-called ‘managed no-deal’ – i.e. no overall Withdrawal Agreement but several ad hoc side-deals concluded on critical issues such as air services – is more likely than no deals on anything whatsoever.

“If you vote down the deal there will be a general election.”

Not true.

The Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 prevents the government from unilaterally calling a general election: parliaments must last for a statutory five-year term. The Act provides two – and only two – ways of triggering an early general election:

The first is for the government to be defeated on a motion of confidence. In that case, a general election results if the government or an alternative administration — e.g. one headed by another Conservative Prime Minister or Labour with the support of others – does not win a fresh confidence vote within 14 days.
The second is for a ‘super-majority’ of the Commons (two-thirds of MPs) to vote in favour of an early election (as happened in 2017).
So the mere fact of the government being defeated on the deal is insufficient to trigger a general election.

It is possible that the prime minister could react to defeat on the deal by submitting a confidence motion to the Commons. Labour, the Lib Dems, and the SNP would undoubtedly vote ‘no confidence’ in the government. But those Conservative and DUP MPs who voted against the Withdrawal Agreement would most likely vote for the confidence motion, since a general election now is not in their interests.

The only way the government could realistically be defeated on a confidence motion is if a handful of Tory ultra-Remainers voted ‘no confidence’ in a calculated bid that bringing down the government could stop Brexit. This would be a huge personal risk for those MPs concerned, particularly those representing Leave-voting constituencies (such as Anna Soubry and Phillip Lee) who would be in especial danger of losing their seats.

The only other way a general election could result is if the government created a super-majority for an election by whipping Conservative MPs to vote for it. This scenario is unthinkably bizarre at a time when the Conservatives are behind Labour in the polls, as there is a high likelihood the government would fall from power.

“If you vote down the deal the government will lose the support of the DUP and therefore there will be a general election.”

Unlikely. (In fact, the government is more likely to lose the support of the DUP if the deal passes the Commons.)

If, as expected, the DUP votes against the deal, this would constitute a breach its confidence and supply agreement. But this is not sufficient to trigger a general election under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act (see above). Given that no-deal is the default legal position if the deal does not pass, the DUP would likely continue to support the government on all other key legislation in order to avoid a confidence vote and resultant general election.

If the deal is passed by the Commons, the DUP would most likely tear up its confidence and supply agreement entirely, and vote against all government legislation as an act of revenge, paralysing the business of government. This is the situation most likely to lead to a vote of no confidence in the government, and subsequent general election.

“There is a pause mechanism in Article 50 – if you vote down the Withdrawal and Implementation Bill the government will just pause the withdrawal process.”

Not true.

There is no pause mechanism in Article 50. The two-year Article 50 period can be extended, but only by the agreement of the UK and the unanimous agreement of the European Council (i.e. every government of the EU27). It is unlikely that EU27 would unanimously agree to extend Article 50, for reasons laid out by the House of Commons’ Exiting the European Union Committee.

There is a current legal challenge as to whether the UK can unilaterally revoke Article 50. The European Court of Justice is due to hear this case on 27 November 2018. The European Commission’s position is that Article 50 cannot be unilaterally revoked by the UK. The government has repeatedly said that it has no intention of revoking Article 50.

Given the precedent of the Supreme Court case R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017], the government could neither extend nor revoke Article 50 without parliamentary approval. Revocation of Article 50 would require an Act of Parliament. Extension would at the very least require affirmative resolutions of both the Commons and Lords to alter the exit date in the 2018 Act, but it may arguably require a full act of parliament. Extension without a full act of parliament would be open to legal challenge.

In short, leaving the EU on 29 March 2019 (deal or no deal) is automatic.

Dr Anna Bailey is a political scientist and editorial consultant for Briefings for Brexit.

Rt Hon Sir Richard Aikens is a former member of the Court of Appeal, former Vice-President of the Consultative Council of European Judges, and a member of the Briefings for Brexit Advisory Committee.

Selling a sellout: the truth about the PM’s ‘deal’ with Brussels
2/12/2018 by Briefings For Brexit

Written by Briefings For Brexit
Taken from: HERE

The Prime Minister is trying to “sell” her Withdrawal Agreement to the country. But she is making totally false claims about it.

The italicised text is taken from the government’s new propaganda website, ‘The Brexit Deal explained‘ HERE

“On 29 March 2019 the United Kingdom will leave the European Union – fulfilling the democratic decision taken by the British public.

“We have achieved a deal with the EU that delivers on that decision, a deal the nation can unite behind and one that Parliament should back.”

*NO. The European Withdrawal Act 2018, which is already law, delivers on that decision. In contrast, the draft Withdrawal Agreement binds the UK indefinitely to the EU in a subordinate position.
*This Withdrawal Agreement is not required for us to leave the EU and regain our status as a sovereign country on 29 March 2019.
*It isn’t even a ‘deal’. There is no future trade agreement with the EU just a non-binding wish-list, with our fisheries, farming, immigration and economic policies all set down as bargaining chips. The Withdrawal Agreement is in fact the most expensive divorce settlement in history, which we are under no legal obligation to sign.

“It is time to get on with it.”

*Indeed it is – but by accepting the current “Withdrawal” Agreement, we are unlikely ever to leave the European Union. It would be more accurately termed the Remain Agreement.

“If we back this Brexit Deal, it means:

“We will control our own borders and end free movement once and for all”

*NO. Free movement remains during the transition period, and rights obtained under free movement laws by EU citizens up to 2021 remain theirs for their lifetime. The UK will be obliged to align its social security rules with those of the EU even after the transition period ends, so benefits will still be exportable to non-resident EU citizens. The Mobility provisions in the political declaration on the future relationship state that free movement will end in theory, but it envisages a raft of measures to facilitate travel for business, study, training and family reasons, which combined will not give us full control over our borders. Free movement is therefore on the table as a negotiating point. The EU is likely to insist on more labour mobility as a condition the future ‘partnership’.

“We will protect jobs with a deal that is good for our economy”

*NO. Less than 50% of our export economy is linked to the EU, with which we run a £95 billion annual trade deficit. Only 10% of UK businesses actually trade with the EU. Economic performance is far more dependent on other factors. The state aid, competition and regulatory alignment provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement and Future Partnership declaration give the EU effective control over British farming and fisheries and a binding say over many key areas of economic policy. Moreover, free trade with the EU is not guaranteed and is subject to continued negotiation with the EU as part of the ‘future partnership’. There is no legally binding commitment on the EU to deliver it. Indeed, the proposed temporary customs union will introduce new trade frictions without the advantages of enabling the UK to set its own trade policies.

“We will no longer send vast sums of money to the EU so we can spend more on our priorities, like investing in our long term plan for the NHS.”

*NO. The Withdrawal Agreement commits us to sending vast sums of money for at least the next ten years to the EU. During the transition period we will have to pay our contribution to all EU budgets as though we were still a member state, with no say in how the money is spent. This is estimated to be around £40 billion pounds in return for absolutely nothing. And under Article 140 we will have to pay the EU for our share of the EU’s future budgetary commitments, as well as those of its decentralised agencies, even made in 2021, when we have supposedly left the EU. These liabilities may fall due up to and beyond 2029.
*Meanwhile, the Withdrawal Agreement allows the EU to commit as much of our money as it wants to as many future programmes as possible for the next two years. We will have no vote on any spending decisions taken but will be legally bound to pay for them. This is clearly not ‘taking back control of our money’, but signing over the UK’s credit card to an organisation which has no incentive whatsoever not to max it out.

“We will be able to strike free trade deals around the world.”

*NO. Although under the Withdrawal Agreement, Article 129(4), the UK can in theory negotiate deals that can come into force after the transition period, the fact the transition period can be extended to 2023, plus the aims of the future UK-EU partnership, make independent trade deals extremely unlikely in reality. The future partnership declaration mirrors the terms of the backstop, which creates a customs union with the EU. This requires us to implement EU tariffs and trade sanctions, mirror the EU’s trade policy, observe close regulatory alignment with the EU and allow the EU to set highly restrictive state aid, competition and environmental laws for the UK. Free trade deals with any other countries could not happen – indeed, under the ‘backstop’ we would lose access to the markets of countries with which the EU has Free Trade Agreements, but those countries retain access to our market. In other wordsm those countries would have no reason to negotiate with the UK, as they would get access to the UK anyway via a deal with the EU, without having to offer any quid pro quo to Britain.
*Furthermore, under Article 129(3) of the Withdrawal Agreement the UK cannot undertake “any action or initiative which is likely to be prejudicial to the Union’s interests, in particular in the framework of any international organisation, agency, conference or forum of which the United Kingdom is a party in its own right.” Therefore, the EU effectively has a veto on our whole foreign and trade policy.

“We will take back control of our laws, ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK”

*NO. The ECJ can continue to impose judgements on us under Withdrawal Agreement for an indefinite number of years to come. And as it has the final say over matters of Union Law and interpretation of the Withdrawal Agreement, it will still have jurisdiction in the UK.
*Furthermore, the Withdrawal Agreement creates an unelected Joint Committee, bound by European law, which becomes a supranational governing body of the United Kingdom. It has the power to make decisions on vast areas of policy in secret and enforce those policies in the United Kingdom with the legal backing of the ECJ.

“We will keep people safe against crime, terrorism and other threats by working closely with European countries”

*NO. A new security partnership is suggested in the Political Declaration but not guaranteed. Moreover, actions on law enforcement and judicial cooperation will be subject to the ECJ and will depend on how many EU obligations we accept (Political Declaration, para. 83). These obligations would seriously undermine our ‘Five Eyes’ security alliance, on which we are vitally dependent. So the dangers from crime and terrorism could get worse under this deal.

“And we will protect the integrity of our United Kingdom”

*NO. The backstop is more likely to lead to the break-up of the UK. It creates a political, regulatory, judicial and fiscal border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, effectively ending the Union as we know it,
It threatens to condemn two million British citizens in Northern Ireland to remain indefinitely subject to most of the rules and institutions of the Single Market. This would impede trade across the Irish Sea. In 2016, Northern Ireland sold £15 billion of goods and services to the rest of the United Kingdom; it exported only £4 billion worth to the Irish Republic.
*A major obstacle to the resumption of power-sharing at Stormont will have been created, and the status of the Province will once again be a sticking-point in relations between the UK and the Republic.
*The backstop is the quickest way to undermine both the Good Friday Agreement and the prosperity of Northern Ireland.
*The people of Northern Ireland would be left in a state of constant uncertainty, trapped between a UK and an EU mired in negotiations, and the leading pawn in every passing squabble. The Irish Republic would become the only representative of the interests of Northern Ireland, with obvious long-term implications for the Union.

“However, if we reject this deal, we will go back to square one. This would mean:

“Damaging uncertainty which will threaten jobs, investment and the economy”

*NO. ‘No deal’ plans are in fact well advanced (despite attempts to keep them secret), and could be implemented in very short order. Successful businesses adapt to changing conditions, and 55% of our exports already go to non-EU countries where markets are always subject to “uncertainty”.
*Chronic “uncertainty” would come if during a damaging ‘transition period’ Britain was trying to negotiate a bespoke deal which the EU is under no legal obligation to agree to.

“More division”

*NO. Accepting this deal would make division worse, because Leave voters recognise it does not deliver on the referendum result and are furious. It would provoke a crisis in our democracy. Realization of the long-term damage being done to the economy during the long and painful transition period, during which the EU can do as it likes and which we would be powerless to resist or to end, would make conflict over Brexit central to our politics for years to come.

“Less time to focus on the issues that matter here at home, like the NHS and our schools”

*NO. Under the proposed deal, the need to continue to negotiate a future relationship (which the EU is not legally obliged to agree to anyway) would necessarily mean continued focus on Brexit until at least 31 December 2020, possibly much longer if the transition period is extended or we enter the backstop by default in the absence of a future trade agreement. Only by getting Brexit done in March 2019 by exiting on WTO terms would we be able to focus on matters at home like the NHS and schools

“So this is the choice: Backing the deal in the national interest so we can build a brighter future – or going back to square one by rejecting it.”

*NO. This is a completely false choice. Brexit will happen on 29 March 2019 without this agreement. There is no need to ‘go back to square one’. An alternative Withdrawal Agreement and future partnership proposal are already in existence (prepared by DExEU under David Davis and rejected by the PM before it could be tabled in Brussels) and this would make a good basis for the rebooting of negotiations so that we actually leave the EU with a trade deal, become fully sovereign and deliver the Brexit people voted for.
*May’s ‘deal’ would keep us tied to the EU for as long as the EU so wishes, because its punishment provisions, which reduce the UK to a satellite state, would be enshrined in an international treaty. Rejecting it should be considered as escaping from a disastrous trap while we still can, rather than going ‘back to square one’.

“However you voted, now is the time to come together. It is time to get on with it.”

*A WTO deal would be ‘getting on with it’. Chucking the draft Withdrawal Agreement and negotiating a trade agreement rather than a political union, would be ‘getting on with it’. Keeping us shackled with no say at all to EU institutions and regulations, plus the ongoing uncertainty of continued discussions on the future relationship is not ‘getting on with it’. This ‘deal’ is nothing but a short-term fig-leaf to disguise the disastrous incompetence of Theresa May and her chosen few in the Article 50 negotiations.

Great posts Exec.

Leaving the EU properly is neither difficult or painful.

The default position is to leave on the 29th March deal or no deal and as their is no majority for any one type of deal in Parliament then currently the most likely outcome is a clean break with ad hoc mini agreements as suggested above.

Fred , why would I need to pray.

People voted to leave and we are leaving on the 29th March. You need to pray someone can find a way of stopping it as I can't see one without Parliament defying the will of the people.

The will of the people, Dilbert?

Is this the 49% who currently think the UK are wrong to leave the EU? Or the 37% who think they're right? Or the other 14% who don't know where Wales is?

:o)

''Jezzer’s dog could do better then Bozo Johnson''

Alf, If your going to quote do quote right!

Not long now before the Informed Referendum now Dil.

Poor Stan. He's so miserable. You really do have to feel sorry for him.

Never seen Santa, Stan?

You should've gone to Specsavers

Ha ha wrong again E/L I'm neither poor or miserable..so like Alf get your facts right!

..Now get clearing that mess up -):

Talking of Santa......seen a house with a lit sign saying : Santa stop here...!....anyway...seeing what's going on in France...if there was a Frexit vote now....there would be an opting out majority I reckon.....the fact that they don't have or will not be allowed a gaulish referendum speaks for itself....